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COMMENT
ADMIRALTY-LAW: CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY THE SEA ACT
- QUASI-DEVIATION - SEDCO, INC. v. MIV STRATHEWE
The concept of "deviation," as that term is used in the area of
admiralty law, refers to a voluntary and unjustifiable departure by a
carrier from its contracted voyage.' The law is well-settled, in both the
United States and England, that such action by a shipowner renders
him liable for any damages or losses to his cargo resulting from that
deviation. Although at one time application of this doctrine was lim-
ited to an actual geographical departure by a carrier from an agreed
upon route, in recent years its use has been expanded to include vari-
ous actions by a carrier which tend to expose his cargo to a greater risk
of damage or loss.2 The confusion associated with this expansive appli-
cation of the deviation doctrine and its relationship to the liability lim-
itation provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 19361
(COGSA) are reflected in the recent decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Sedco, Inc. v. M/V
Strathewe.4
In June of 1982, Sedco, Inc. (Sedco) contracted with the British
shipping line Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Ltd. ("P &
0") to ship eighteen packages of oil drilling equipment from Dubai,
Saudi Arabia to Houston, Texas.5 The equipment was loaded on board
the P & 0 vessel MIV Strathewe, which departed from Dubai in the
early part of June." Soon after her departure, the Strathewe was requi-
sitioned by the British Government for service in the Falkland Islands
1. The United States Supreme Court has defined deviation as a "voluntary departure
without necessity from the regular and usual course of a voyage .... " Hostetter v. Park,
137 U.S. 30, 40 (1890); see also G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 3-40, at 177
(2d ed. 1975).
2. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 1, § 3-41, at 182.
3. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1982).
4. 800 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1986).
5. Id. at 29.
6. Id.
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War, in accordance with that country's war powers.7 In response to or-
ders to discharge her present cargo at a convenient port, the ship pro-
ceeded to Malta,8 which in addition to being on her course to Britain,
was also on the course of another P & 0 vessel, the M/V Strathesk, en
route to Houston, Texas.9 Sedco's cargo was offloaded by P & 0 at
Malta on June 12th.10 In mid-July, Sedco's custom's broker in Houston
twice inquired of P & 0 as to the estimated date of arrival of the cargo,
and in both instances he was told the cargo would arrive aboard the M1
V Strathewe on August 24th.1 1 On August 4th, after a third inquiry as
to the estimated arrival date, P & 0 informed Sedco's agent that the
cargo had been discharged at Malta and reloaded on the M/V
Strathesk which had departed on August 3rd.1 2 The Strathesk arrived
in Houston on August 30th with only sixteen of Sedco's eighteen pack-
ages.'" Although the Strathesk's shipping manifest stated that eighteen
packages had been reloaded, only sixteen actually were. The other two
packages were left on a pier in Malta and were not located until 1984,
at which time they could only be sold by Sedco as salvage. 4
Sedco brought suit against P & 0 in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York 5 for the value of the lost
cargo."" The claim asserted that the Strathewe's departure from its in-
tended voyage and P & O's subsequent misrepresentations and post-
discharge negligence in the handling of Sedco's cargo constituted an
unreasonable deviation, thereby voiding COGSA's $500 per package li-
ability limitation. 7 The district court held that P & O's failure to no-
tify Sedco that its cargo had been offloaded at Malta, coupled with
their erroneous representations that the cargo was still aboard the
Strathewe when in fact it was still in Malta, and their inability to
properly reload all eighteen packages amounted to an unreasonable
7. Id.
8. Id. The following message was received: "Your vessel Strathewe is required for
service in connexion [sic] with the Falkland Islands Emergency. Request you instruct
your master to proceed to Southampton at best speed discharging present cargo at a port
convenient to you subject to minimum delay." Id.
9. Sedco, Inc. v. MN Strathewe, 630 F. Supp. 120, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
10. 800 F.2d at 29.
11. 630 F. Supp. at 121.
12. Sedco, Inc. v. M/V Strathewe, 800 F.2d 27, 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Sedco, Inc. v. M/V Strathewe, 630 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
16. Id. at 122. Sedco had contracted to sell the lost drilling equipment for $350,000.
The salvage value was $167,362.52; thus Sedco sought to recover $182,637.48. Id.
17. See 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1982).
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deviation, precluding P & O's reliance on the liability limitation. 8 On
appeal, the Second Circuit, in an opinion which reflects the ambiguous
application of the deviation doctrine, held that P & O's actions did not
amount to an unreasonable deviation within the meaning of COGSA
and thus P & O's liability was governed by the $500 per package limit
imposed by COGSA. 9
Traditionally, carriers were held liable for all damages or losses to
their cargo which were not the result of an act of God, the public en-
emy, the fault of the shipper, or the inherent characteristics of the
cargo. 20 This held true even absent negligence or fault on the part of
the carrier."' The rationale behind this somewhat harsh rule was that
the carrier was in sole possession and control of the cargo, thereby
lending credence to fears that they might very well steal the goods
which they were carrying.22 Moreover, such exclusive possession made
it virtually impossible for a cargo owner to effectively prove the true
cause of his loss.23 Thus, it was not necessary for shippers to assert a
carrier's geographic deviation as a distinct basis of liability, since even
non-deviating carriers were liable for cargo losses not attributable to
one of the above-mentioned exceptions. 4 It was in response to this rule
of "carriers as insurers" that shipowners began to insert various clauses
and provisions into their bills of lading, which had the effect of con-
tracting away their liability. 5 These clauses generally were held valid
as "[p]rinciples of freedom of contract prevented courts from refusing
to enforce these stipulations."
2'
18. 630 F. Supp. at 122. P & 0 also contended that pursuant to COGSA's "restraint
of princes" defense, it was immune from liability. Under this defense, where a sovereign's
assertion of control over a vessel is the proximate cause of the loss, the carrier will be
relieved from liability. See Baker Castor Oil Co. v. Insurance Co. of America, 157 F.2d 3,
4-5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 800 (1946). Both courts here rejected this defense
since P & O's activities, and not the British government's restraint, were the proximate
cause of Sedco's loss. 630 F. Supp. at 121; Sedco, Inc. v. M/V Strathewe, 800 F.2d 27, 32-
33 (2d Cir. 1986).
19. 800 F.2d at 33.
20. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 1, § 3-22, at 139-40; see also Propeller
Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 7, 23 (1859); Clark v. Barnwell, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
272, 282 (1851). Even where a loss was attributable to one of these common law excep-
tions, a showing of fault or negligence on the carrier's part would result in imposition of
liability upon the carrier. Id.
21. Sorkin, Changing Concepts of Liability, 17 FORUM 710 (1981).
22. See Forward v. Pittard, 99 Eng. Rep. 953 (K.B. 1785).
23. Id.
24. Friedell, The Deviating Ship, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1535, 1537 (1981); see supra note
20 and accompanying text.
25. Friedell, supra note 24, at 1549.
26. Id. at 1537.
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One of the more common provisions inserted into bills of lading by
carriers to limit their liability was the valuation clause, which stipu-
lated the value of the cargo. Often fixed at $100 per package, these
clauses were usually enforced under the theory that cargo owners had
the opportunity to pay a higher price and declare a higher valuation."
It was the widespread use of the valuation clauses and other liability
limitation provisions during the nineteenth century from which the no-
tion of deviation as a distinct basis of liability arose."8
With the introduction of steam powered vessels during the Indus-
trial Revolution and England's traditional maritime history, it seemed
inevitable that British ships would dominate the trans-atlantic ship-
ping market.29 Thus, it was no surprise that British bills of lading gen-
erally contained the most extreme liability limitation provisions." In
the United States, where the use of these provisions was prevalent only
among rail carriers, their validity was generally determined by state
contract law. 1 While such liability provisions were valid where not
prohibited by state law, clauses excusing liability for negligence were
deemed against public policy and generally unenforceable.3 2 British
courts, on the other hand, were more receptive to negligence clauses,
and while narrowly construed, they were nevertheless enforced. 3  This
sharp conflict demonstrated the need for uniformity in the area of car-
rier liability, for as one court noted, "the state of the law put American
shipowners at a great disadvantage ....
27. Hart v. Pennsylvania R.R., 112 U.S. 331, 340-41 (1884). Of course, where shippers
were not given "fair opportunity" to opt for a higher valuation, such clauses were unen-
forceable. See, e.g., New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128,
135 (1953) ("[o]nly by granting its customers a fair opportunity to choose between higher
or lower liability by paying a correspondingly greater or lesser charge can a carrier law-
fully limit recovery to an amount less than actual loss sustained"); Boston & Me. R.R. v.
Piper, 246 U.S. 439, 444-45 (1918).
28. Friedell, supra note 24, at 1537.
29. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 1, § 3-23, at 142.
30. Id.
31. Sorkin, supra note 21, at 711.
32. Compania la Flecha v. Brauer, 168 U.S. 104 (1897); Liverpool Steam Co., v. Phoe-
nix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397 (1888); Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357
(1873). While the federal courts uniformly held this view, prior to the establishment of
federal supremacy in admiralty matters, state courts occasionally upheld these clauses.
See, e.g., Blair v. Erie R.R., 66 N.Y. 313 (1876).
33. See, e.g., Bodenham v. Bennet, 146 Eng. Rep. 384 (Ex. 1817); In re Missouri S.S.
Co., 42 Ch. D. 321 (1889). Legislation in this area was also lacking, for as one court
noted, "the English shipowners were powerful in Parliament and they used their influ-
ence to block legislation." Wirth Ltd. v. S.S. Acadia Forest, 537 F.2d 1272, 1277 (5th Cir.
1976) (quoting A. KNAUTH, OCEAN BILLS OF LADING at 120 (4th ed. 1953)).
34. Wirth Ltd. v. S.S. Acadia Forest, 537 F.2d 1272, 1277 (5th Cir. 1976); see also
Nichman Co. v. M.V. Farland, 462 F.2d 319, 327 (2d Cir. 1972) ("Ultimately, this process
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The first legislative response to the competing interests of shippers
and carriers came from the United States Congress in 1893, with pas-
sage of the Harter Act. 5 This Act attempted to achieve a compromise
between those interests concerned with the carrier's liability and those
concerned with protection of the shipper's cargo. The first section pro-
hibited bills of lading covering shipments "from or between ports of
the United States and foreign ports" 6 from containing any provisions
tending to limit carrier liability for "loss or damage [to cargo] arising
from negligence, fault or failure in proper loading, stowage, custody,
care or proper delivery."3 7 The carrier was also prevented from at-
tempting to contract out of his liability for failure to provide a seawor-
thy vessel."' Section 3 of the Act, which reflected a response to the
carrier's interests, provided that no carrier "shall become or be held
responsible for damage or loss resulting from faults or errors in naviga-
tion or in the management of said vessel ... ."89 One treatise summed
up the results of this compromise as follows:
[T]he shipowner could not contract out of the duty to use care
to put his vessel in good shape for the voyage, or the duty to
care properly for the goods while they were in his hands
aboard. On the other hand, if he did use due care to send a
seaworthy vessel on the voyage, he could not be held for the
defaults of those he put in charge, in regard to running her.40
The Harter Act proved to be an effective compromise; it was so
well received in the international sphere that the uniformity of liability
indicative of coastal voyages in the United States ultimately was estab-
lished worldwide through enactment of the Hague Rules,' 1 promul-
gated at the Brussels Convention of 1924. In 1936, the United States
ratified the Convention and enacted COGSA, a virtual word-for-word
adoption of the Hague Rules.2 Today, COGSA governs all foreign
transport to and from the United States while the Harter Act regulates
threatened to turn the general maritime law on its head, with English courts and some
state courts-though not courts of the United States-honoring even bills of lading pro-
visions excepting public carriers from liability for loss due to their own negligence and
that of their employees.").
35. 27 Stat. 445 (1893) (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196 (1982)).
36. 46 U.S.C. § 190 (1982).
37. Id. § 190.
38. Id. § 191.
39. Id. § 192.
40. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 1, at 182.
41. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of
Lading (Hague Rules), Aug. 25, 1924, 120 L.N.T.S. 157 [hereinafter Hague Rules].
42. 49 Stat. 1207 (1936) (current version at 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1982)).
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coastal transport within the United States.
COGSA's attempt to achieve uniformity of liability while at the
same time mitigating the harsh common law rule holding carriers to be
insurers of their cargo is reflected in Section 1304(5), which provides:
Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or be-
come liable for any loss or damage to or in connection with the
transportation of goods in an amount exceeding $500 per pack-
age . . .unless the nature and value of such goods have been
declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the
bill of lading."3
This clause, and the effect that a carrier's deviation has on the package
limitation, has been the subject of immense litigation.
While COGSA does not provide a specific definition of deviation,
pre-COGSA cases have defined it to be a "voluntary departure without
necessity or reasonable cause from the regular and usual course of the
voyage."44 The general rule before the promulgation of COGSA was
that a carrier's geographical departure from his route amounted to a
repudiation of the contracted voyage, thus ousting the carriage con-
tract along with any liability limitations, and effectively rendering the
carrier an insurer of his cargo.' This rule was based upon the law of
marine insurance, which held that an insurer was only liable for those
risks which were contemplated by the contracted voyage." Once a car-
rier unreasonably deviated from that route, the insurer was relieved of
his obligations as an insurer since the carrier's actions in effect voided
the insurance contract. The rationale in both cases was that the parties
to the agreement have contracted only for that voyage which is re-
flected in the bill of lading and any deviation amounts to a substitution
of a new voyage, to which the bill of lading does not apply."7 Thus, in
the celebrated pre-COGSA case, The Willdomino, 8 where a ship
knowingly left port with an insufficient supply of coal to complete the
voyage and was forced to deviate from its contracted route, the United
States Supreme Court held that the carrier was liable for the damage
43. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1982).
44. Hostetter v. Park, 137 U.S. 30, 40 (1890).
45. S.S. Willdomino v. Citro Chem. Co., 272 U.S. 718, 725 (1927).
46. See Friedell, supra note 24, at 1543.
47. See, e.g., Lavabre v. Wilson, 99 Eng. Rep. 185 (K.B. 1779), where Lord Mansfield
wrote: "The true objection to a deviation is not the increase of the risk ... i. lt is, that
the party contracting has voluntarily substituted another voyage for that which has been
insured." Id. at 189.
48. 272 U.S. 718 (1927).
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to its cargo which occurred when the ship subsequently struck a reef.4
In holding that the carrier could not avail itself of the liability limita-
tions of the then applicable Harter Act, the Court noted "[n]othing in
the present bills of lading suggests that the vessel might wander about
the sea heading first for one port, and then without adequate reason
for another."50 This rationale found support in England as well.51
Though the doctrine of deviation was originally limited to cases
involving a carrier's geographical departure from its contracted voyage,
it was later applied to situations where there was no departure from
the agreed upon route. Here the deviation results from misconduct by
a carrier which is so repugnant to the carriage contract as to amount to
a material breach of that contract.2 This concept of "quasi-deviation"
was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in 1923 in the case
of St. Johns N.F. Shipping Corp. v. S.A. Companhia Geral Commer-
cial, 53 where the Court held that a carrier's stowage of cargo on deck
when the contract of carriage stipulated carriage below deck, rendered
the carrier liable for the subsequent damage to that cargo." Recogni-
tion and acceptance of this theory as a basis for ousting liability limita-
tions incorporated into bills of lading quickly opened the courts to a
whole new class of deviation cases. Other quasi-deviation theories in-
clude: dry docking with cargo on board;5 carriage by rail;"6 misrepre-
sentation in bills of lading; 5 carriage on a different vessel;5" and unrea-
sonable delay.59
49. Id. at 724-25.
50. Id. at 727.
51. See, e.g., Joseph Thorley, Ltd. v. Orchis S.S. Co. [19071 1 K.B. 660, 669 (C.A.);
Balian & Sons v. Joly, Victoria & Co., 6 T.L.R. 345 (C.A. 1890); Leduc & Co. v. Ward,
[1888] 20 Q.B.D. 475 (C.A.).
52. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 1, § 3-41, at 182.
53. 263 U.S. 119 (1923).
54. Id. at 123. "[T]he clean bill of lading amounted to a positive representation...
that the goods would go under deck. By stowing the goods on deck the vessel... exposed
them to greater risk than had been agreed and thereby directly caused the loss." Id. at
124; see also The Southlands, 37 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1930); The Gualala, 178 F. 402 (9th
Cir. 1910).
55. The Indrapura, 171 F. 929 (D.Or. 1909).
56. The Jean Jadot, 14 F. Supp. 161 (E.D.N.Y. 1935); The Princess Anne, 1925
A.M.C. 1638 (S.D.N.Y. 1925).
57. Berisford Metals Corp. v. S/S Salvador, 779 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1985); American
Industries Corp. v. M.V. Margarita, 556 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
58. Sidney Blumenthal & Co., Inc. v. United States, 21 F.2d 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1927),
rev'd on other grounds, 30 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1929).
59. The Morristown, 19 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1927); The Ontario, 1925 A.M.C. 1353
(S.D.N.Y. 1925); The San Guiseppe, 1923 A.M.C. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1922); The Citta Di
Messina, 169 F. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1909); Hellenic Army Command v. M.V. Livorno, 1981
A.M.C. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (not officially reported); Little Lisa Ltd. v. NYK Line, 77
19881
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It is important to note that under COGSA, liability for deviation
attaches only where it is unreasonable. As Section 1303(4) of the Act
states:
Any deviation in saving or attempting to save . . . property at
sea, or any reasonable deviation shall not be deemed to be an
infringement or breach of this [Act] or of the contract of car-
riage, and the carrier shall not be liable for any loss or damage
resulting therefrom: Provided, however, that if the deviation is
for the purpose of loading or unloading cargo ... it shall, prima
facie, be regarded as unreasonable'60
While it is clear that COGSA has abolished the harsh common law
rule that any deviation rendered the carrier liable, the Act does not
indicate what the effect of an unreasonable deviation is. The Seventh
Circuit, in Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. Poseidon Shiffahrt,61 held that
even a carrier's unreasonable deviation from the contract of voyage will
not void COGSA's $500 per package liability limitation.2 This view is
based upon the language of Section 1304(5) of the Act which states,'
"[n]either the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be liable ... in an
amount exceeding $500 per package."63 Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that the absolute terms of Section 1304(5) completely abolished
the common law doctrine of deviation." This interpretation has found
little support,6 and the majority view seems to be reflected in deci-
sions by the Second, Fifth and Ninth Circuits, which hold that an un-
reasonable deviation amounts to a repudiation of the voyage contract,
thus rendering the carrier liable for any resulting losses. 6 The reason-
ing of these circuits is based upon the view that had Congress intended
to completely abolish the common law doctrine, it would have done so
Civ. 5368 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (not officially reported).
60. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(4) (1982) (emphasis in original).
61. 313 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1963).
62. Id. at 875.
63. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1982) (emphasis added).
64. 313 F.2d at 874-75.
65. See Nassau Glass Co. v. M.V. Noel Roberts, 249 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.Fia. 1965);
Varian Assocs. v. Compagne Generale Transatlantique, 85 Cal. App. 3d 369, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 534 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
66. See Nemeth v. General S.S. Corp., 694 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1982); Calmaquip Eng'g
West Hemisphere Corp. v. West Coast Carriers, Ltd., 650 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1981); Spar-
tus Corp. v. S.S. Yafo, 590 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1979); Iligan Integrated Steel Mills, Inc. v.
S.S. John Weyerhaeuser, 507 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1974); Du Pont de Nemours Int'l S.A. v.
S.S. Mormacvega, 493 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1974); Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. S.S.
Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1969); Searoad Shipping Co. v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., 361 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1966).
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in unambiguous language. For as one court noted, "such a drastic
change in the existing law, with its far-reaching consequences in the
commercial and financial world would have been expressed in clear and
unmistakable terms.
67
In Sedco, the Second Circuit was again faced with an appeal of a
district court decision expanding the doctrine of quasi-deviation. The
district court here held that the post-discharge conduct of P & 0,
namely its failure to inform Sedco that the cargo had been offloaded at
Malta, its misrepresentations that the cargo was still on board the
Strathewe, and its failure to properly reload all eighteen packages,
constituted a quasi-deviation and thus voided COGSA's $500 per pack-
age liability limitation. 8 In an opinion by Judge Miner, the Second
Circuit reversed the lower court and held that the deviation to Malta
by the Strathewe was reasonable, and more importantly, that the neg-
ligence and misrepresentations of P & 0 did not constitute any devia-
tion within COGSA's meaning. 9
With respect to a geographical deviation, Section 1304(4) states in
part that where a carrier deviates "[flor the purpose of loading or un-
loading cargo or passengers, it shall prima facie be regarded as unrea-
sonable. '7 0 In the present case, the Strathewe's detour to Malta to un-
load Sedco's cargo, although in response to orders from the British
Government, clearly constituted an unreasonable deviation under the
above language. This presumption of unreasonableness, however, is not
irrebuttable. Citing to a leading treatise on admiralty law, the court
noted the rationale behind the proviso creating the presumption: "the
carrier ought not to be allowed to deviate with no other motive than
the increase of his own revenues; thus the proof required to overcome
the prima facie unreasonableness of such a deviation would have to
show something more than mere reasonableness from the point of view
of the carrier .... ,,71 In viewing the circumstances surrounding the
Strathewe's departure, it was clear that pecuniary gain was not a moti-
vating factor behind the deviation to Malta. Furthermore, as the facts
show, Malta's proximity with respect to cargo en route to the United
States certainly made the island an appropriate port in which to dis-
charge the Sedco cargo.7" As a result, the Second Circuit had little dif-
ficulty in affirming the district court's finding that the "geographical"
67. Jones v. The Flying Clipper, 116 F. Supp. 386, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
68. Sedco, Inc. v. M/V Strathewe, 630 F. Supp. 120, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
69. Sedco, Inc. v. M/V Strathewe, 800 F.2d 27, 33 (2d Cir. 1986).
70. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(4) (1982).
71. 800 F.2d at 31 (quoting G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 1, § 3-40, at 179).
72. See 630 F. Supp. at 121.
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deviation by the Strathewe was "reasonable and sensible.""3
The Second Circuit's reversal of the district court's finding with
regard to the quasi-deviation issue is somewhat more troubling. This
argument focused on the post-discharge negligence and misrepresenta-
tions of P & 0 and its agents following the Strathewe's arrival in
Malta: "(1) in failing to reload all eighteen pieces of cargo at Malta, (2)
in erroneously responding to Sedco and its agent in mid-July that the
cargo was still aboard the Strathewe, and (3) in failing to immediately
locate the misplaced cargo . ... "7
As the opinion noted, the doctrine of quasi-deviation has had lim-
ited application in the Second Circuit.7 5 This view is a reflection of the
trend to restrict the quasi-deviation doctrine as expressed by Judge
Friendly in Iligan Integrated Steel Mills, Inc. v. SS John Weyerhaeu-
ser,7 6 where he noted that the concept of quasi-deviation seems to run
counter to the absolute language of Section 1304(5) of COGSA and
thus "the principle of 'quasi-deviation' is not one to be extended.
77
Traditionally, the doctrine served to protect shippers whose cargo
would no longer be insured once the carrier departed from his con-
tracted voyages.7 Today, however, this is not generally the case since
most cargo insurers cover shippers' losses whether or not there was a
geographical deviation. 79 Thus, the justifications for the doctrine are no
longer valid, and account for the trend towards limiting its expansive
application.
Presently, there appears to be some conflict within the Second Cir-
cuit as to just how far the doctrine of quasi-deviation extends. The
Sedco opinion correctly stated that it has had limited application
within the circuit.80 The court, however, incorrectly stated that the
doctrine has been limited to situations involving on-deck stowage.81
In Berisford Metals Corp. v. S.S. Salvador 82, a decision handed
down only eight months before Sedco yet not cited by the court, a dif-
ferent panel of the Second Circuit 8" held that a carrier's misrepresen-
tations in the bill of lading with respect to the condition of the cargo
73. 800 F.2d at 31.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 31-32.
76. 507 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1974).
77. Id. at 72.
78. See Friedell, supra note 24, at 1543.
79. Id. at 1544; see also G. GiLMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 1, § 3-40, at 176-77.
80. Sedco, Inc. v. MN Strathewe, 800 F.2d 27, 31-32 (2d Cir. 1986).
81. Id. at 31.
82. 779 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1985).
83. The panel in Sedco was composed of Judges Newman, Pierce and Miner, while
the panel in Berisford was composed of Judges Friendly, Mansfield and Winter.
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"amounted to a fundamental breach going to the very essence of its
contract" and precluded reliance upon COGSA's liability limitation
provision.8 4 The opinion, authored by Judge Mansfield, reaffirmed the
court's reluctance to extend the quasi-deviation doctrine and justified
this result as adherence to the well-settled holding of Olivier Straw
Goods Corp. v. Osaka Shosen Kaisha, ("Olivier I").85 Although a pre-
COGSA case, the holding of Olivier II today stands for the proposition
that "the $500 per package limitation of liability may not be invoked
by a carrier that has issued an on board bill of lading erroneously rep-
resenting that goods were loaded aboard its ship, regardless whether or
not the carrier acted fraudulently." 86 In Berisford, the carrier received
one hundred bundles of tin ingots and issued a bill of lading, with re-
spect to its own conduct, that those one hundred bundles had been
loaded on board its ship." As it turned out, only thirty were loaded,
while the other seventy mysteriously disappeared. 8 In precluding the
carrier from asserting COGSA's liability limitation provisions, the
court stated, "[w]e hold simply that when a carrier misrepresents its
own conduct in loading goods aboard ship it is responsible for the mis-
representation and may not invoke contract provisions incorporating
COGSA's limitations on liability." 89
The Berisford decision is extremely relevant, given the facts in
Sedco, and yet the court here chose not even to cite it. As in Berisford,
P & 0 misrepresented its own conduct to Sedco regarding the status of
Sedco's cargo. Although P & 0 told Sedco's agent that the cargo would
arrive in Texas on August 24th aboard the Strathewe,90 the cargo had
in fact been sitting on a dock in Malta since June 12th." These mis-
representations were repeated upon a second inquiry and it was not
until a third inquiry on August 4th that Sedco was informed that the
eighteen packages had been discharged and reloaded on the Strathesk,
which had departed one day earlier.9 ' In addition, that the shipping
manifest of the Strathesk stated all eighteen packages had been
84. 779 F.2d at 848.
85. 47 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 856 (1931). The Olivier case was
subject to two appeals in the Second Circuit. The first, 27 F.2d 129 ("Olivier "), was
affirmed on remand to the district court, at 47 F.2d 878 ("Olivier IF').
86. 779 F.2d at 846. In Olivier H, the court held that a carrier's misrepresentations
regarding its own conduct precluded its reliance on the favorable liability limitations
stipulated in the bill of lading.
87. Id. at 843.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 849.
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reloaded when in fact only sixteen were seems to suggest that further
misrepresentations were perpetrated.93
Unlike the Berisford case, the facts in Sedco seem to suggest a
fraudulent misrepresentation, since it appears that information con-
cerning the status of the Sedco cargo was either known to P & O's
agent or at least readily ascertainable, given Sedco's repeated inquiries.
Furthermore, that the Strathesk's shipping manifest stated that eigh-
teen packages had been loaded also suggests fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion by P & 0 for as the district court decision noted, "a number of
people from stevedores to ship personnel did not count from 16 to
18."4
Under the Berisford decision, which reaffirms Olivier II, there is
no need to even prove that the carrier acted fraudulently. It is suffi-
cient that the misrepresentation pertains to the carrier's own conduct,
and that it amounts to a "fundamental breach going to the very es-
sence of its contract . . . ."" While it is true that the misrepresenta-
tions in Berisford were contained in the bill of lading whereas in
Sedco, they were contained in the shipping manifest, the offloading at
Malta and the degree of misrepresentations by P & 0 would still seem
to bring this case under the holding of Berisford, precluding assertion
of COGSA's liability limitations.96
In distinguishing the cases cited by Sedco in their brief, the court
wrote, "[t]he cases cited, however, either involve one of the two types
of deviation recognized in this circuit [geographical and on-deck stow-
age], or were decided before the enactment of COGSA, or were decided
in circuits where deviation does not void the COGSA limitation of lia-
bility. '9 7 These last two qualifications made by the court are somewhat
questionable. With respect to pre-COGSA decisions, the court seems to
suggest that these decisions have been completely superceded by
COGSA and thus have no precedential value. In reality, however, these
cases are superceded only to the extent that they hold that any devia-
tion by carrier precludes reliance on any liability limitations contained
in the bill of lading. Indeed, given COGSA's lack of any definition of
"deviation," courts today have been forced to look to pre-COGSA deci-
sions for guidance.9" Furthermore, the decision in Berisford expresses
93. Id.
94. Sedco, Inc. v. M/V Strathewe, 630 F. Supp. 120, 121 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
95. Berisford Metals Corp. v. S.S. Salvador, 779 F.2d 841, 848 (2d Cir. 1985).
96. The court in Berisford noted the "necessity for maintaining the integrity of and
confidence in bills of lading," given the indispensable role they play in international
trade and commerce. 779 F.2d at 845.
97. Sedco, Inc. v. M/V Strathewe, 800 F.2d 27, 32 (2d Cir. 1986).
98. 2A BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 122, at 12-13 (1986).
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its adherence to the holding in Olivier II, a pre-COGSA case."
The second category of cases distinguished by the Sedco court are
those which hold that even an unreasonable deviation does not pre-
clude reliance on COGSA's limitation of liability. 10 0 This is a minority
view followed only by the Seventh Circuit, as enunciated in the case of
Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. Poseidon Shiffahrt.101 There the court rec-
ognized that a delay of one and a half years in delivery constituted an
unreasonable deviation.'0" While the holding in that case, that even an
unreasonable deviation cannot preclude reliance on COGSA's liability
limitations, is indeed the minority view, its finding that unreasonable
delay constitutes an unreasonable deviation finds support in decisions
both prior to and after the enactment of COGSA, 0 s contrary to the
Sedco court's implication that only the unreported decision of Hellenic
Army Command v. M.V. Livorno,0" supports this view.'05
The case law of the Second Circuit which speaks on the doctrine
of quasi-deviation clearly demonstrates that notwithstanding the lan-
guage in Sedco, its application is not limited to cases involving on-deck
stowage.'06 The exact limits of this doctrine, however, are far from
clear, given the Sedco court's misstatements, omissions and distinc-
tions. This decision is a prime example of the confusion and conflict
that exists with respect to this area of admiralty law, and serves only
to further thwart the long sought after goal of uniformity in cases in-
volving carrier deviation, which lies at the very heart of COGSA.
99. 779 F.2d at 846.
100. Sedco, Inc., v. M/V Strathewe, 800 F.2d 27, 32.
101. 313 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1985).
102. Id. at 874-75.
103. See, e.g., The Hermosa, 57 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1932); The Ontario, 1925 A.M.C.
1353 (S.D.N.Y. 1925); The San Giuseppe, 1923 A.M.C. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1922); Little Lisa
Ltd. v. NYK Line, 77 Civ. 6368 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (not officially reported).
104. 1981 A.M.C. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (not officially reported).
105. Sedco, Inc. v. MAT Strathewe, 800 F.2d 27, 32 n.2.
106. See, e.g., Agfa-Gevaert, Inc. v. S/S "TFL Adams", No. 82 Civ. 4038 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 26, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), where Judge Kram, wrote: "Decisions in
this court, and in this Circuit, have held the deviation doctrine applicable (and the limi-
tations provisions of COGSA inapplicable) in situations other than on-deck stowage."
Id. (emphasis added). In Agfa, a carrier's reckless conduct was challenged as an unrea-
sonable deviation. Although the presence of recklessness was deemed an issue to be re-
solved at trial, a reading of the decision seems to suggest that the court here espoused
recklessness as an additional form of quasi-deviation. See also infra note 107.
1988]
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Perhaps the state of the law governing carrier deviation following the
decision in Sedco Inc. v. M.V. Strathewe was best summed up over
sixty years ago by the eminent jurist Learned Hand when he wrote
"(t]he law regarding deviation does not seem to me very clear.' 0 7
Irwin Nack
107. The Poznan, 276 F. 418, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). On Sept. 2, 1987, following a trial
on the issue of recklessness, the Agfa court declined to vitiate COGSA's liability limita-
tion provisions. In support of her decision, Judge Kram wrote: "Since TFL was not reck-
less, its acts did not constitute a quasi-deviation." Agfa, No. 82 Civ. 4038. Thus, it is
clear that even after the Sedco decision, at least one court in the Second Circuit contin-
ues to recognize the application of the doctrine of quasi-deviation to situations other
than one of on-deck storage.
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